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Abstract 
The Philippines and the U.S. united by historical ties, long 
associations and mutual interest regard their relationship 
as “special relationship.” The security relationship has 
been evolving through different phases and stages. 
Towards the end of Obama administration, the 
Philippines-U.S. relationship nearly hit a dead end. 
However, in the current scenario with the “evolving 
Philippines-China relations” and the blossoming of 
“bromance” between Philippines President Duterte and 
the U.S. president Trump it seems   Duterte’s diplomacy 
has risen to the occasion. This article seeks to examine the 
background of the security relationship between the 
Philippines and the United States. It will throw light on the 
current trends of the Philippines-US strategic relation and 
examine its implications and sustainability.  
Keywords: United States, China, Philippines, 
Security Relationship, Strategic 
Historical Backdrop of the Security Relationship 
The U.S. and the Philippines have shared a long 
historical association which dates back to the 
19th Century when the Philippines was under the 
Spanish colonial rule. The Filipinos and the 
Americans fought side by side against the Spanish 
which was colonising the Philippines for over three 
centuries.  On December 10, 1898, under the Treaty 
of Paris Spain ceded the Philippines to the U.S. for 
twenty million dollars. Thus, began the era of U.S. 
rule. In 1934, under the Tydings-Mc Duffie Act, the 
Philippines came under Common Wealth 
Government till independence on July 4, 1946. Post-
independence the two countries became a close ally 
thus heralding a “special relationship.” The 
Philippines is the only country into which the 
American values, democracy and institutions have 
been so deeply entrenched. The United States is her 
main trading partner, the source of foreign 
investment, biggest military ally, and a source of a 
large part of her political tradition as well as a 
cultural model for many Filipinos. Undoubtedly, 
American influence is greater in the Philippines than 
the rest of Asia (Wurfel1966:150). As the popular 
maxim goes the Philippines was shaped by “300 
years in the convent and 50 years in Hollywood” 
(Hincks 2016). 
During the World War II, the Common Wealth of 
Philippines was briefly occupied by the Imperialist 
Japanese forces (1941-1945), the Filipinos and 
Americans fought collectively against the Japanese 
forces. As a result of Japanese invasion, the 
Philippines was in a bad shape. Hence ,it turned to 
the U.S. for support and assistance. On March 1947 
the Military Base Agreement (MBA)was signed 
between the Philippines and the United States. 
Under the treaty, the Philippines allow the U.S. to 
use its military base for a period of ninety-nine 
years. However, later with an amendment, the 
ninety-nine-year period was reduced to twenty-five 
years with the provision that it can be subject to 
renewal if mutually agreed upon(Lim1987:422). 
During the Cold War, the Philippine government 
supported most of the United States Foreign Policy 
development in Asia. 
“It [Philippines] accepted both economic and 
military aid, refused to recognize Communist China, 
allowed American forces to remain on the 
Philippines soil, sent troops to fight in Korea, 
sponsored the Pacific Charter, promoted SEATO, 
spoke up for democratic ideals and hopes at 
Bandung, and in general stood firmly by its former 
guardian and present ally” (Taylor1966:72). 
Post-Independence, the Mutual Defense Treaty 
(1951) and the Visiting Forces Agreement (1998) 
became an essential component of the security 
relationship between the two countries. Another 
critical security component was the Mutual Logistic 
Support Agreement 2002 and 2007 (renewed in 
November 2007) between the two allied states 
which calls for “increased logistics cooperation.” In 
other words, security relation or agreement has 
become one of the most important binding factors in 
the bilateral relationship between the formal master 
and colony. 
Withdrawal of the military base and its 
aftermath 
The military bases in the Philippines provided 
logistic support to the U.S. military operations in the 
Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and even to the 
Northeast Asia. It also targeted to support operations 
in East Africa and provide a conduit to the Middle 
East. The Soviet access to naval and air facilities in 
Vietnam, 700 miles away enhanced the importance 
of the bases.  The bases are an important element in 
the “regional superpower balance” and an indication 
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of “U.S. regional pre-eminence” 
(Mediansky1987:308-309). In fact, the base 
provided the Philippines security umbrella and 
economic gain. However, the presence of the 
military bases is also a source of tension between the 
Philippines and the United States. Furthermore, 
there were other factors which brought hiccups in 
the bilateral security relationship like the issue of 
compensation payments, criminal jurisdiction and 
the issue of national sovereignty (Storey1999:102-
103). Besides, with the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the end of Cold War the importance of the 
Philippines has diminished in the United States 
security radar. 
A sense of nationalism fostered in the Filipino 
leaders which invoked debate between the pro and 
the anti-U.S.  Military base establishment. For the 
nationalist, the military base was a grim reminder of 
the neo-colonialist relationship imposed by the 
former master, the U.S. Indubitably, the military 
base contributed a great deal to the Philippines weak 
economy. Next to the Philippines government, the 
bases are the second largest single employment 
generator (Berry Jr.1990:316). On September 16, 
1991, the Philippine-American Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which 
provided for a continued U.S. military presence for 
ten years was rejected by the Philippines Senate by 
a vote of 12-11. This resulted in the withdrawal of 
the U.S. military base namely Clark Air Base, Subic 
Naval base. However, the withdrawal of U.S. 
military bases was regarded by the nationalist as 
defending democracy, protecting sovereignty and 
expressing national pride. Post the base closure, 
security relationship between the two began to 
wane. In the post-Cold War period, the relationship 
between the two countries was at a “low phase.”  
As the Philippines heavily depended on the United 
States for its security challenges, it neglected its 
internal defense Capabilities. The Armed forces of 
the Philippines (AFP) was under-armed and lacked 
sophistication, besides, the country battled threats of 
insurgency and terrorist along with assertive China 
in the South China Sea. The country, hence, suffered 
numerous security challenges.Thus, the lack of 
Philippines-US defense cooperation has resulted in 
a “power vacuum” that China has taken advantage 
of (Fisher Jr 1999). In 1995 Mischief Reefs incident 
raised alarmed to the Philippines government as 
China built structure within the Philippines 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). As a result, in 
1998 to counter the growing assertiveness of China 
in the South China Sea, the limited capability of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the lack 
of Philippine capability to tackle the rising 
“transnational security concerns” resulted in the 
signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement(VFA) 
with the United States.The VFA authorise the 
“rotational presence” of the U.S. troops in the 
Philippines. The VFA eased the relationship, 
however, “not necessarily revived” it. It provides the 
legal framework for the two countries to resume 
joint military exercises. Besides, it presented 
substance to the MDT, reminding both countries of 
their “special relations” (Banlaio 2002:299). Since 
the VFA came into existence, the Philippines - 
United States forces have been conducting joint 
military exercises under the series called 
"Balikatan" meaning Shoulder-to-shoulder (Banlaio 
2002:300). The VFA also provided that U.S. troops 
undertake a “non-combat role” and prohibited 
“permanent base of operations” on the Philippines 
(Lum &Dolven 2014:12). 
 PH-US Partners against Crime-War on Terror 
When the U.S. declared “War on Terror” after 9/11 
terrorist attack, Philippines President Gloria 
Macapagal Arroyo promptly declared its support for 
the Global war on terrorism. The Philippines even 
offered its military facilities at the former Clark 
Base and Subic Naval Base for the U.S. troops 
deployed in Afghanistan. In reciprocal, the U.S. 
promised Philippines U.S. $100 million for 
development aid and the U.S. $55 million for anti-
terrorism drive (Caballero-Anthony 2002:1). In 
recognition of the Philippines role in the fight 
against War on Terror, “Major Non-NATO Ally 
(MNNA)” status was conferred on October 6, 2003. 
This exchange of mutual support is a milestone in 
Philippine -U.S. relations as it resuscitates the 
security relations between the two countries 
(Banlaoi 2002:295). The Philippines has its own 
problem of terrorism  and has become an important 
epicenter and haven for groups like the Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), 
allegedly linked to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida 
group. In the early 1990s, the Al Qaeda funded the 
Abu Sayyaf group through Mohammed Jamal 
Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law through Islamic 
charities in the southern Philippines. According to 
reports, the 1993 World Trade Centre bombings was 
plotted by Ramzi Yousef. He also set up Al Qaeda 
cell in Manila and was accused of conspiring to kill 
the Pope and planning various attacks 
(Niksch2007:4-5). As the Philippines has terrorist 
groups active in the country it served as an important 
network and channel for the U.S. policy of “War on 
Terror.” Thus, the two countries make a great team 
in the fight against terrorism. 
On November 2002, the Military Logistics and 
Support Agreement (MLSA) was signed for a period 
of five years which permitted the American forces 
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to use the Philippines as a “logistic support, supplies 
and services” for military operations in the region. 
The U.S. Forces were positioned to support the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in counter-
terrorism activities. The Joint exercises targeted 
mainly at the terrorist network in western Mindanao 
and Sulu weakened the terrorist threat (Lum 
&Dolven 2014:12). 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(EDCA) 
Under President Benigno Aquino the relationship 
was warm and cordial which led to three important 
strategic components namely, internal balancing by 
a policy of defense modernization, diplomatic legal 
strategy, taking the South China Sea under 
international arbitration and increasing of security 
cooperation with U.S. and other countries like 
Australia, South Korea, Vietnam and Japan 
(Greitens 2016). Most importantly, just prior to 
President Barack Obama’s visit to the Philippines, 
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 
(EDCA) was signed with the U.S. on April 2014, 
which was in aligned with the ‘U.S. policy of Pivot’ 
in the Asia Pacific. Though there were skeptics of 
the legality of EDCA dreading that it will result in 
the permanent presence of American troops in the 
Philippines nonetheless the Supreme Court 
approved the EDCA on January 2016. The 
framework agreement of EDCA provided for “the 
increased presence of U.S. military forces, ships, 
aircraft, and equipment in the Philippines on a non-
permanent basis and greater U.S. access to 
Philippine military bases” (Lum&Dolven 2014:3).  
Evolving Relationship with China and 
Implications 
Since President Rodrigue ‘Rody’ Duterte came to 
office on May 9, 2016, the power equation between 
the Philippines and the U.S. began to change. 
President Duterte’s foreign policy orientation is a 
departure from his predecessor, Benigno S. Aquino 
III, who was a staunch supporter of the U.S. During 
his four days visit to China on October 2016, 
President Duterte signed 13 documents on bilateral 
cooperation agreements with China which is a sign 
of ‘evolving relationship.’ He even threatened 
“separation” from the United States. During Obama 
administration, the relations turned soured as the 
President criticized Duterte drug war to which 
Duterte reacted negatively and thus drifted towards 
friendlier stance with China and Russia. However, 
Duterte on his return from Beijing, “clarified” 
that he could not cut ties with the U.S. as “the 
Filipinos in the United States will kill me” 
(Hincks2016). 
On January 2013, Benigno Aquino III government 
under the U.N. Convention on the Law of Sea 
(UNCLOS) filed a case against China which 
claimed the entire South China Sea. The Hague 
ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 
in 2016 went in favour of the Philippines. China was 
absent throughout the proceeding and it refuses to 
comply with the ruling (Santos 2016). According to 
the Chinese President Xi Jinping, The Hague ruling 
would not have an impact on the ‘territorial 
sovereignty and marine rights’ in the South China 
Sea and that China is ‘committed to resolving 
disputes’ with its neighbours (Philips, et al. 2016). 
Since China simply refuse to comply with the ruling 
unless there is an enforcement mechanism The 
Hague verdict will remain ineffective. It is not 
certain whether the U.S. will come to defend the 
Philippines in the case of a military confrontation 
between the Philippines and China. The U.S. 
reiterated on the freedom of navigation and 
commerce on the South China Sea. Nonetheless, it 
has so far refused to take a committed stand in the 
territorial disputes of the South China Sea for fear of 
jeopardizing its relations with Beijing. It is rather 
playing safe and remains aloof from the unnecessary 
entanglement which could bring hiccups to the 
bilateral relations between Washington and Beijing. 
The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 raised concern 
as the treaty does not have automatic assistance 
provision under the treaty, in case of an attack on the 
Philippines, the United States must “meet the 
common dangers in accordance with its 
constitutional processes.” It is not clear whether the 
United States’ treaty obligations apply to the South 
China Sea scramble if in any case military 
confrontation arise (Greitens 2016). 
Duterte’s attempt to curry “diplomatic and 
economic concessions from China” belittled the 
South China Sea conflict in the ASEAN summit 
meeting in Laos (Renato Cruz De Castro2017:140). 
However, it is uncertain how long the Philippines 
and China would undermine the South China issue 
given their history of occasional confrontation in the 
past.  Duterte’s shift in fostering the Sino-
Philippines relations has given China the upper hand 
to “undermine ASEAN centrality” in South China 
Sea disputes, thus, compelling Other claimant states 
to move forward with a bigger role not merely by 
protecting their respective interests rather to give 
more emphasis to “ASEAN centrality” in handling 
the issue. National defense and Security should not 
be compromised by the Philippines or any ASEAN 
country over economic cooperation with China. It is 
necessary for ASEAN nations to put forward 
“common interest” and have “unified stance” on the 
South China Sea and should not count on “single 
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member or external partners” to resolve the 
problem. It is naïve to assume to China would back 
down in the South China Sea due to positive 
developments of relations (Principe 2017).  
Internal security challenges and US assistance 
The Philippines has a “complicated security 
environment, encompassing significant internal 
challenges.” The archipelago is vulnerable to natural 
disasters which require massive demand on the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) 
operations. Besides, it faces domestic challenges 
related to crime, piracy, terrorism and insurgency 
movements (Greitens 2017).  The Typhoon 
Yolanda (Haiyan) in November 2013 which claimed 
thousands of lives reflected Philippines weakness in 
disaster management and relief. The U.S.  forces 
immediately responded to the disaster and 
coordinated closely with the Philippines in disaster 
and humanitarian assistance. 
In terms of internal security threat battling terrorism 
in the Southern Philippines has been one of the most 
pressing security challenges. On May 2017 the 
Maute group allied to the Islamic State attacked the 
Marawi city of Lanao del Sur led by Isnilon Hapilon 
and the Maute brothers, Omar and Abdullah. This 
resulted in the declaration of Martial Law in the 
entire area of Mindanao region till December 31, 
2017. The U.S. provided “security assistance and 
training” to the AFP in the “areas of intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance” (Morales and 
Lewis 2017). Ironically, President Duterte who had 
brutally criticized the U.S. needs their help to battle 
the IS threat in the region even more and he later 
acknowledged the U.S. for their assistance. This is a 
reversal of Duterte from his earlier statements 
against the U.S. and its intervention. With the killing 
of the leaders Hapilon and the Maute, the five-month 
siege ended on October 16, 2017. 
PH-US Keeping alliance intact? 
Though Duterte on several occasions has threatened 
to sever ties with the U.S. no substantial change has 
been visible, the 2017 calendar of joint activities 
have been unchanged. It will take some time for the 
Philippines-U.S. security relations to become clear, 
given the mercurial character of both the 
controversial Presidents (Dalpino 2017:5). The 
Philippines-U.S. engages in several other security 
engagement platforms such as Mutual Defense 
Board (MDB) - Security Engagement Board (SEB), 
Balikatan Exercise etc. Furthermore, on September 
2017, Exercise Tempest Wind, a bilateral multi-
agency drill was inaugurated which intended to test 
and improve the ability of Filipino and the United 
States troops to “plan, coordinate and conduct 
counterterrorism operation”. It ran for five days 
from September 18 - 26 in Clark Field, Pampanga 
where over 1,200 Philippine and US civilian and 
military officials participated. This first 
counterterrorism drills the two forces strengthen the 
campaign against the Maute terror group as it joined 
forces with the ISIS (Viray 2017). Another military 
exercise carried out under Trump and Duterte 
administration was KAMANDAG (Cooperation of 
warriors of the Sea) held on October 2017 which 
was in line with the MDT and VFA. The 
KAMANDAG focus on “enhancing 
counterterrorism capabilities, humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief capabilities, and 
conducting humanitarian and civic assistance 
projects” (Flanagan2017). 
Towards the end of Obama Administration, the 
Philippines-US Security relations nearly hit a dead 
end however with Duterte-Trump Administration 
the relationship recalibrated. Duterte’s foreign 
policy preserves US security guarantees but at the 
same time availing economic benefits from China. 
With Duterte administration the Philippine -U.S. 
uneasiness has alleviated as he advanced more 
“constructive personal ties” with Trump (Steinbock 
2017).  Trump being less critical towards Duterte 
and his extrajudicial killings, the two leaders shared 
a great bonding. In the telephonic conversation, 
President Trump commended Duterte that he was 
“doing an unbelievable job on the drug problem” 
(See Philstar May 25, 2017 Transcript).  
 As President Duterte seeks for an ‘independent 
foreign policy’, the truth is that the Philippines is 
still significantly reliant on the US, particularly in 
defense. Moreover, reducing dependence on 
Washington will take decades which is not feasible 
within the six-year term (Parameswaran, 2016). The 
Philippines reducing its dependence on the United 
States should not be regarded as a sign of Manila 
shifting away from the ‘US pivot in Asia’ nor as an 
evolving bandwagoning with Beijing. Rather, it is a 
rational foreign policy alternative for enhancing its 
strategic interest by “omnidirectional hedging” with 
other regional powers (Suorsa 2016). In maintaining 
a balance in foreign policy with the U.S. and China, 
the Philippines has several factors to be taken into 
considerations, namely, China’s massive economic 
clout which is an element the Philippines have to 
take into considerations. On the other hand, 
domestic security challenges, like the country’s 
huge demand for Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Relief (HADR), insurgency problem and 
counter-terrorist activities, and last not the least, to 
shed the image of American neo-colonialism 
(Greitens 2016). Thus, Philippines is caught 
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between the economic giant China and the 
traditional security provider the U.S.  However; it 
should be noted that both the U.S. and China 
friendship comes with a “string attached to it’’. 
Moreover, in the “complex security landscape of the 
21st century, it is more difficult for most countries to 
have clear-cut strategic alignment” (Galang 2017). 
According to the Philippine defense officials, China 
has been pushing for greater security cooperation in 
the future. However, there is a limitation of Sino-
Philippine cooperation which is in a “low level” as 
compared to the Manila’s traditional partners as well 
as “lingering distrust” of the two countries due to the 
South China Sea differences (See Parameswaran 
2017). 
 On the recently concluded President Trump 12-day 
trip to Asia on November 2017 Trump attended the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
summit in Vietnam on Nov. 10, subsequently 
followed by the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations summit in the Philippines. On the sidelines 
of ASEAN summit at Manila the two leaders had a 
bilateral meeting, the meeting focused on the “areas 
of common ground” such as “Islamic State and 
illegal drugs as well as on trade issues.” During the 
conversation, Trump did not criticize Duterte on the 
drug war, though drug problem briefly came up, 
however, the subject of right was not broached. 
Trump also boast having “Great Relationship” with 
President Duterte (Davis 2017). The Philippines-
U.S. security relation is the “fallback position of 
Duterte’s hedging approach (i.e., independent 
foreign policy),” on the other hand, for the US 
security alliance is an integral part of representing 
its “superpower status.” Among others, security 
alignment with the Philippines reinforces its ability 
to “penetrate the East Asian Regional Security 
Complex.” Therefore, it is apparently in the interests 
of both countries to maintain the security alliance 
and the continuation of the Philippines-U.S. security 
relations can be anticipated (Vicedo 2017). 
Conclusion 
 Retrospection of the historical security relationship 
one can observe that the Philippines and U.S. have 
been through various ups and downs. However, 
despite the occasional tension and hiccups in their 
relationship in the past the so-called “Special 
relationship” have managed to endure. In the current 
geopolitical landscape, the Philippines stuck in a 
dilemma between “traditional ally” and “new found 
friend” vis-a-vis security and economic priority that 
is, the United States and China respectively. 
However, it should be noted that the Philippines is 
one of the most pro-American nations in the world 
and Philippines-American connection range from a 
whole gamut of security, economy, political, 
cultural and people-to-people tie. The Philippines-
US strategic relations have endured in the past and 
it will hopefully endure in the future and so far, 
Duterte’s smart diplomacy pays off in engaging both 
“the giants.” 
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